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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
How does the school instruct us? What is it like for a student to learn in a school? 
The following thesis construes the school as a site for disciplinary technology purportedly 
oriented toward educating students. My conceptual analysis rests on the intersection 
between the sociohistorical practice of schooling and the lived experience of students. I 
contrast schooling (the organization of a primary planned environment for instruction) 
and education (an existential facet of growth and social connectedness) at the center of 
the essay. My argument has three parts. First, I examine Michel Foucault’s concept of 
disciplinary technology as it pertains to the school. Second, I develop the existential 
presuppositions of Foucault’s argument through evidence from the field of 
phenomenology. Third, I sketch a normative conception of education, supported by the 
philosophy of John Dewey and elaborate on the dangers of discipline through a reading 
of Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology.” While this thesis 
thoroughly problematizes a central aspect of modern pedagogy, it does not provide 
simple solutions and merely hopes to examine the complicated intersection between 
“disciplinary” pedagogy and lived experience in order to deepen our understanding of 
each of these fields. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
QUESTIONING THE SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 My thesis research began with the apparently simple and direct question: “how 
have I been educated?”. Such a question carries weight by being familiar, personal, 
relatable, and yet it is not a question that is easily approached. It is plainly philosophical 
in that the question does not in itself beget the application of a particular method; 
moreover, answering it requires introducing many further questions as well as many 
varied attempts at addressing such questions. At the outset, I find myself opening onto a 
field that is both “supersaturated” and also one with numerous points of entry, 
innumerable objects for possible study, several methods of approach, and many academic 
fields that could be utilized. In this introduction, I discuss the field of concern that 
motivates this essay and also layout the scaffolding for the particular path I have chosen 
to take to explore that concern further.  
 I am senior at the University of Maine, studying philosophy and political science. 
This spring will proffer another academic ritual for me--college graduation. My B.A. will 
be the conclusion of a decade and a half of studies in the United States. I am at a moment 
where I need to decide what comes next, and like many before me I want to reflect on 
and consult what I have already decided--that is, where I have been. Here my question 
shifts with the words “so many before me.” Sure, I experience my singularity and ipseity, 
but I can also recognize my substitutability. Standing in line at graduation, sitting in a 
desk during classes, paying loans: from a certain institutional standpoint, I am 
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exchangeable. I am anyone. For this reason, the question of how one is educated has 
taken on a specific significance for me at this stage of my life. 
 This brings me closer to the field of concern that situates a still more specific 
thesis question. “How is one educated?” is a question that I find as interesting as it is 
inaccessible given my current skill set. It falls into similar pitfalls as the personal 
question I asked, “How have I been educated?”. It is by working with these questions that 
I arrive at my project.  
In addition to its personal roots, this thesis grows from my intersecting studies of 
phenomenology and politics. My engagement with the former has developed my concern 
for the personal and relational, while the latter directs my attention toward a deep concern 
for institutionalized power structures. From my interest in phenomenological philosophy, 
when I think about education, I consider the precarious, ongoing, and unavoidable project 
of personal development that each of us undertakes in relationship to the world and to 
others. From my studies in political science, when I question education, the political 
institutions that aim at educating, namely schools, also come immediately to mind and 
into question. The school is a collectively supported institution, and yet each student 
needs to develop personal strategies in order to navigate through it. From this 
intersection, I selected a philosophical project. I ask the still open-ended question: “How 
does the school instruct students?”.  
 In order to address this question thoroughly, I evaluate the school as a place of 
application for disciplinary technology, a form of power relations examined in Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish. This allows me to examine Foucault’s thesis that society can 
invest individuals with forms of behavior and value systems. Furthermore, I am interested 
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in moving “behind” Discipline and Punish in order to explore a complementary level of 
analysis: the lived experience of students. In this direction, I apply several concepts from 
the field of Phenomenology to discuss how the institutional practice of “schooling” 
intersects with the personal project of “dwelling” or becoming at-home in the world. 
Through these two directions of analysis (sociohistorical and experiential), and by 
arguing for a normative sense of education that contrasts with “schooling,” I further 
problematize disciplinary schooling and begin to offer alternative directions.  
We all act, and are acted upon in manifold ways throughout our lives. We develop 
our personal identities within each of these dimensions of experience. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and other phenomenologists are useful in understanding identity construction, 
because of their commitment to describing the experience of involvement in the world as 
it appears in a first-person manner. Furthermore, I observe that we, sociohistorical 
collectives of persons, organize spatial arrangements, temporal durations, cultural 
objects, and behavioral styles for us, experiencing agents, to inherit. We “inherit” such 
collective projects by sustaining, altering, or abandoning them. Critical social theorists, 
like Foucault, focus on the way that such collective practices delimit the possibilities for 
individual development. While these personal and collective practices intersect, the 
temporality of these collective practices does not coincide entirely with the time of our 
personal development; our personal process of self-development is interrupted by (and 
interrupts) this social activity.1 While one necessarily depends upon guidance from 
others, and common institutions of meaning (like language, normality, animality, etc.) in 
order to maintain effective relationships to spaces, times, objects, and others, one cannot 
                                               
1 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 35-36. 
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ultimately depend on others to construct these relationships for oneself. This existential 
work is always, inexplicably “mine” for each and every one of us. Each of us needs to 
develop such relationships, whether we recognize that we are doing so or not. 
 When one considers the guidance that we give and receive from others, one is 
faced with the reality that the cultural world is segmented. Deleuze and Guattari 
creatively explore such segmentarity at length in A Thousand Plateaus.  
We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human 
being is a segmentary animal. Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata 
composing us. Dwelling, getting around, working, playing: life is spatially 
and socially segmented. The house is segmented according to its rooms' 
assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city; the factory, 
according to the nature of the work and operations performed in it. We are 
segmented in a binary fashion, following the great major dualist 
oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so 
on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in ever larger circles, ever 
wider disks or coronas, like Joyce's ‘letter’: my affairs, my neighborhood's 
affairs, my city's, my country's, the world's ... We are segmented in a 
linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which 
each segment represents an episode or "proceeding": as soon as we finish 
one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or procedured, in 
the family, in school, in the army, on the job. School tells us, ‘You're not 
at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You're not in school anymore’ …2 
 
One can begin to experience the weight of such segmentarity in the very style of this 
staccato paragraph. The school, a complicated and prevalent institution of modern 
society, is the “segment” of life that I am bringing under philosophical investigation. 
Perhaps it is obvious that the school itself operates by enforcing segmentarity, but such 
common sense should not prevent us from exploring this phenomenon. Instead, the 
provocative claim that “the human being is a segmentary animal” should help guide us 
                                               
2
 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 208-209.  
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into the rich question this thesis hopes to explore: how does the school “school” us? What 
segments does it create and how do we inherit them? 
 At the outset, the central terms “education” and “the school” should be 
preliminarily defined. Both of these terms circulate commonly and can seem to be 
immediately comprehensible, but for a systematic analysis their meanings should be as 
clear as possible. Following a Deweyan distinction between these terms, education lends 
itself to two broad and interrelated definitions, while the school should be initially 
understood as a means of education. The two definitions for education that I suggest 
follow the distinction that we have begun to explore between social and individual 
temporality.  
At the social level, education is a necessity for the continuity of the life of any 
group or collective practice.3 It is common to discuss the life of a nation, a tribe, a club, 
or any group, but (as noted above) the time that these groups occupy is not synonymous 
with the life of any particular individual. A group can disband without any members 
dying, and it can persist when many of the constitutive individuals perish. As any living 
thing, John Dewey argues, societies survive by constant renewals. All constituent 
members of a social group begin their lives without comprehensive language, beliefs, 
values, norms, and the re-creation of such social practices allows the life of the group to 
persist. The renewing activity that allows society to exist is education. Education is this 
communication of habits of thinking, doing, and feeling. As Dewey elaborates, to give or 
receive communication is to have “an enlarged and changed experience.”4 When 
                                               
3 John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, (New York: 
Free Press 1944), 2. 
4 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 5. 
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listening, one shares in the thoughts and feelings of another, and insofar has her own 
experience modified. When conveying an experience, one must formulate the experience 
while considering how it would appear to another, and necessarily has her own attitude 
toward the experience modified. The social necessity of education leads organically to 
the individual definition. 
 To the individual, education is the broadening and deepening of experience: it is 
synonymous with growth. Said in another form, insofar as an activity broadens and 
deepens experience, it is educative. The human infant is highly dependent on others in 
order to persist, and begins with plasticity--the ability to grow.5 Humans begin with a 
vibrant social environment and the ability to learn from experiences. Partaking in the 
reconstruction of the values, beliefs, aims, and norms of the group is educative for the 
constituent members--especially in those social groups that establish the growth of 
constituents as a primary value. Educative lessons can also occur outside of interpersonal 
communication, as when an individual struggles with a personal challenge alone, but as 
fundamentally interdependent beings no activity takes place entirely outside of the social 
background.6 The growth of individual members, in turn, provides a basis for the growth 
of social groups, as the new members creatively modify the traditions they inherit. Each 
level of our definition of education leads to the other. Education is the broadening and 
deepening of a person’s experience, and (insofar as it is connected to social beings) 
accounts for the continuity and growth of social groups.  
                                               
5 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 42  
6 Ibid., 44. Dewey memorably chastises the illusion of complete self-sufficiency as “an unnamed form of 
insanity which is responsible for a great deal of the remediable suffering in the world.” 
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 Schooling is the organization of a planned environment for education. While 
many places and experiences are educative, the school is an institution formally intended 
to direct the youth toward sharing and shaping the common life of the group. Living 
always affords educative opportunities, but many of these are lessons are incidental. In 
contrast, the raison d’etre of school is in its effect on the quality of conscious life. It 
provides a place for directing the growth of the students. Directing the students’ growth is 
an accurate explanation of teaching, because 
the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education 
which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they 
act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by 
means of the environment.7 
 
Schools are an established medium for the tuition of the young. This environment could 
be thought of as a unity of many orders (symbols, social roles, norms, concepts, 
exercises, periods, spaces, etc.) with which the activity of the students must vary. The 
activity of the students is a constitutive element of the school environment. A school is an 
environment designed with the deliberate intention of educating. 
While these preliminary definitions are important, I doubt that a satisfactory 
response to the question “how does the school instruct us?” will become clear from 
deduction alone. Discussing the school, for example, will require us to step beyond the 
concept of a school as a planned instructional space, to the concrete relations internally 
organized in schools. In this direction, I take up a reading of a recent critical philosopher, 
Michel Foucault, in order to focus on the ways that we are acted upon within the school, 
and I explore presuppositions in Foucault’s argument to understand the activity of 
students within the school. While in their intention, schools may be a means for 
                                               
7 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 18-19. 
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educating, in practice schooling and education may have a more complicated 
relationship.  
Foucault would agree with Dewey that the school is modern society’s primary 
planned environment for instruction, but by analyzing the predominant power structures 
in the school, Foucault argues that it is also an institution that has been indelibly tied to 
an exhaustive form of social control--“discipline.” Foucault seems to extend the 
observation that one can only direct the education of another person by controlling the 
environment, by arguing that a very particular environment can invest a person with 
predetermined values, ideas, and behaviors. By reading Foucault, I hope to understand 
“the political investments of the body that [the institution] gathers together in its closed 
architecture.”8 I want to understand how the school may in fact invest our bodies with 
behaviors, attitudes, and concepts. Foucault argues that modern schooling normalizes 
students into the attitudes, habits, and concepts that allow for a directable, efficient, but 
politically ineffectual social body.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, I establish the concept of discipline. I then 
briefly explore Foucault’s engagement with power relations and the modern form of 
power relations that he distills in Discipline and Punish--namely, the Panopticon. I then 
step back to discuss the particular ways that Foucault suggests that panoptic principles 
develop and operate in the school. This process focuses my analysis on the structuring of 
spaces, times, and object relations in school to see how such segmentation leads to what 
Foucault calls “docile bodies.”9 I consider how such “docile” students are subjected to 
                                               
8 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Random House, 1977), 31. 
9  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 135-169. 
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“correct training” by means of normative judgments and hierarchical observation in order 
to enact the total form of disciplinary power.10 Throughout this section, I will supplement 
Foucault’s particular examples by my own schooling experiences, in effect arguing that 
discipline continues to be an effective organizing principle for understanding schooling. 
In the second chapter of the thesis, I explore the irreducible forms of embodied 
behavior presupposed in the concept of discipline. In order for discipline to function, the 
subjected persons need to skillfully deploy instruments, develop practices into habits, and 
experience anxiety under the weight of surveilling gazes. I explore these forms of 
behavior through several key phenomenological concepts--namely Heidegger’s 
encountering through “readiness-to-hand,” Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habit-body, 
and Sartre’s conceptualization of “the look.” These phenomenological concepts enrich 
the foundations of discipline, and provide important points of contrast to disciplinary 
power. 
Finally, in the third chapter of the thesis, I explain the tremendous danger of the 
school’s disciplinary aspects, and I contrast this sense of schooling with a normative 
concept of education. I expand upon the problems of panoptic schooling by elaborating 
on the dangers of this “technology,” through a reading of Martin Heidegger’s essay “The 
Question Concerning Technology.” Then I contrast schooling with an existentially-
informed sense of education, connected to the philosophy of Dewey and the project of 
becoming at home in the world.11 Disciplinary technology risks making students mere 
resources of society, rather than recognizing their essential role in shaping their society, 
                                               
10 Ibid., 171-194 
11 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 10-22 
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therefore I argue that a moral sense of education is antithetical to the political “docility” 
described by Foucault.  
  
  11 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
THE SCHOOL AND DISCIPLINE 
 
 
 
“We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human being is a segmentary 
animal [...] forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the job.”12 
 
 In this chapter, I describe the ways that we are “procedured” and “proceduring” in 
the school. I begin by exploring how we are procedured in the school. I want to get a 
sense of how thoroughly we are shaped by this institution, and to do so in a systematic 
way. In order to structure this aspect of schooling adequately, I follow Foucault’s 
discussion of power relations in the school within Discipline and Punish to see how 
student behavior is directed by the school environment. The segmentarity that Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe may seem to be such a ubiquitous aspect of the 
creation of a place for the school in society at large, and of organizing the internal 
operations of the school that I do not want to merely raise a truism. Foucault argues that 
much of the segmentarity in the school is not arbitrary, but part of a comprehensive 
process of investing power in bodies called “discipline.” I begin this chapter by 
presenting this central term, and then briefly explore Foucault’s engagement with 
“power,” since discipline is constantly referred to as a form of power. I then discuss the 
model of disciplinary power (the “Panopticon”), and the emergence and adjustments to 
this model in actual scholastic settings. Effectively, this chapter hopes to explore the 
                                               
12 Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 208-209.  
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continued relevance for the concept of discipline in understanding schooling. Let us 
begin to see how this is so. 
Foucault uses “discipline” as a technical term: it is an emergent technology for 
organizing social relations that has a history. Rather than providing a fixed definition for 
discipline from the beginning of his argument, Foucault names the third part of his book 
“Discipline” and lets the meaning of the term unfold across the argument.13 This could be 
because the meaning that discipline has as a familiar vocabulary word can help to 
illustrate the technical term: it is a means of adjusting behavior and habits. Selecting this 
familiar word suggests that Foucault does not want discipline to be thought of as an 
inaccessible abstraction. It is practical and accessible, but its history needs to be closely 
studied. Many historical quotes that Foucault selects even use the word themselves.14 
From this historical analysis, Foucault analyzes “discipline” as a referent applied to a 
series of practices that individuate, supervise, and coerce behavior from bodies. 
Discipline is the unifying principle for the historical ascendance of a new power of 
punishment by coercion that accompanied the formation of republican states. The 
following indicates more fully the meaning of discipline as a technical term:  
Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an 
apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise comprising a 
whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, 
targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.15 
 
                                               
13 Michel Foucault, “Part III: Discipline,” in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated 
Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977). My analysis of Foucault largely draws from this part of 
Discipline and Punish, which is composed of three chapters: “Docile Bodies,” “The Means of Correct 
Training,” and “Panopticism.” 
14 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 16. “‘Discipline must be made national,’ said Guibert. ‘The state that I 
depict will have a simple, reliable, easily controlled administration. It will resemble those huge machines, 
which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects.’” 
15  Ibid., 215. 
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Discipline is the technology of power relations that came to predominance across the 
17th and 18th centuries. In fairness to Foucault, I do not want to strip the word of its 
accessibility any further; instead, the meaning will become clearer over the course of this 
chapter. For now, discipline should be thought of as techniques for correcting the 
behavior of bodies. 
Foucault observes that the demands on the behavior of the body in modern society 
are extremely pressing: one must continually act in the proper manner, toward the right 
objects, in the correct spaces, over the expected duration, alongside others, with an 
awareness of oneself. There is a tradition of thought that has long considered virtue to 
make such demands on human behavior, but Foucault examines the concrete mechanisms 
by which society directs human behavior more exactingly toward such norms.16 Human 
bodies have “always been in the grip of very strict powers,” but with disciplinary power 
“there is a [new] modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the 
process of the activity rather than its result [...] and it partitions as closely as possible 
time, space, movement.”17 Through his analysis of discipline, Foucault argues that much 
of our individual behavior is actually the result of an investment in us by exhaustive 
relations of control. Tracing the development of the power relations that can make such 
sustained demands on the body, Foucault uncovers a specific form for disciplinary 
                                               
16 Aristotle, W.D. Ross, and Lesley Brown, The Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). In Book II, Chapter 6, Aristotle argues that “[Moral virtue] is concerned with passions and actions, 
and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and 
appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in 
both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is 
characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.” 
The intermediate and best expression of passions and actions are done in variation with self, others, objects, 
means and times. 
17 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136-137. 
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power: the Panopticon.18 Before we address this form, we should briefly explore 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power. 
 
Foucault and Power 
Each and every one of us has been born into a world that was not of our making. 
There were already people, objects, narratives, norms and languages that conditioned the 
world we grow up within. Most importantly for our current inquiry, when we were born, 
there were already some systems of government in place, and there was a discoverable 
history that could help explain the particulars of the time and place into which each of us 
is thrown.19 Looking to the past in order to understand the current systems of punishment, 
for example, Foucault notices that calls for prison reform are nearly as old as this form of 
punishment, and that the issue does not seem to be with particular harms done by the 
prison environment, rather the issue is “its very materiality as an instrument and vector of 
power; it is this whole technology of power over the body.”20 Foucault maintains that the 
exhaustively designed environments of many modern institutions (prisons, workshops, 
army camps, schools, etc.) can “invest” our bodies with certain behaviors, inclinations, 
concepts and beliefs. These institutions create and support the norms that condition (and 
therefore both allow for and limit) our experiences and understandings. Foucault further 
argues that our behavior is, to a large degree, a meticulous investment from the society 
                                               
18  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-205. 
19 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962), 174, 219-224, 264. “Throwness” is a term Heidegger used to describe the way we find 
ourselves caught up in the midst of a definite world and some entities within the world. When he introduces 
the term in Being and Time he says that the term “is meant to suggest the facticity of [Dasein’s] being 
delivered over. The ‘that it is and has to be.’”  
20 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30. 
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into which we are born. He comes to these conclusions largely as the result of his critical 
engagement with social theory, particularly around the concept of power. 
Throughout his oeuvre, Foucault consistently inverted the traditional question of 
political philosophy. Rather than asking how philosophy, as “that discourse which par 
excellence is concerned with truth,”21 can discover the essence and limits of sovereignty 
(and thereby determine legitimacy), Foucault asks how power operates at the periphery, 
where the state becomes capillary and most directly interacts with the people.22 Rather 
than wondering what a “true” exercise of power looks like, Foucault asks what “truths” 
are created by the exercise of power in a society. We could restate that question by asking 
“what mechanisms are used to control the public?”. A central consequence of Foucault’s 
analysis is that the conduct of the individual is largely the result of “all the political 
investments of the body” that follow our particular system of power relations.23 
Power, in Foucault’s analysis, is most simply expressed as action upon the field of 
actions.24 Foucault observes that we all act within particular conditions, and some actions 
change these conditions. Insofar as an action sustains, restricts, or expands the field in 
which we act, that action is an expression of power. Power, as a consequence, is not a 
property that something or someone possesses, power circulates throughout the field. It is 
always relational, and exists between actions. Insofar as one’s actions can be affected by 
others, and vice versa, a situation of power is present. This is effectively to say that 
whenever there are multiple people together, there is some situation of power.  
                                               
21 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited Colin 
Gordon, (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 93. Original emphasis. 
22 Ibid., 94. 
23 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 31. 
24
 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (summer, 1982), 789. 
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Foucault likens power to the broader meaning that “government” had in the 
sixteenth century. Today, the term “government” is concerned with political institutions 
and issues of the state, but in the sixteenth century “it designated the way in which the 
conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed.”25 By acting upon our environment 
(the conditions in which our actions are situated), we “govern” our behavior and the 
actions of others. All social formations change the conditions in which actions occur, and 
as a result we cannot talk about a society without power, nor will the destruction of all 
power relationships. A society “beyond” or “without” power can only be imagined by 
abstracting from the real. 
The necessity of power relations for associated life requires that they be analyzed. 
Whenever there is a social relation, there is also some power relation; but how power 
exists concretely in any particular social situation remains a question for analysis.26 Thus, 
the omnipresence of power in associated life “makes all the more politically necessary 
the analysis of power relations in a given society.”27 That power is an ever-present 
feature of associated life needs to be qualified by the recognition that forms of power 
vary wildly, depending on the demands of the society and the mechanisms it employs. 
                                               
25 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 790. 
26 Jacques Derrida, “The Politics of Friendship,” The Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 11 (1988), 634. Derrida 
makes this point in “The Politics of Friendship,” carrying what we are calling power relations (actions on 
the field of actions, or governing) to the dyadic form of an originary expression with a particular other. In 
the very act of addressing another, in the moment we begin to signify something to someone, we find we 
are already caught up in responsibility. In relating to others, “we are already taken or caught up, each and 
any one of us, in a kind of asymmetrical and heternomcial curvature of the social space, more precisely, in 
the relation to the other prior to any organized socius, to any determined ‘government’ to any ‘law.’ [...] 
Please note: prior to any determined law, as either natural law or positive law, but not prior to any law in 
general, because this heteronomical and asymmetrical curvature of a sort of originary sociality is a law, 
perhaps the very essence of law” (Derrida, 634). This address will also require some conditions for 
communicability. There must be norms of recognition, language, signs belonging to “anyone.” These 
conditions are Foucault’s focus, rather than dyadic connections to particular others. In either case, sociality 
is “governing.” 
27
 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 791. 
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Furthermore, from the observation that power relations in general are necessary, it does 
not follow that the particular, established power relations in a society are necessary. We 
should distill a few of consequences from the conceptualization of power as a relational 
property that delimits the field of actions before proceeding to analyze how power 
operates in the school.  
Power relations are always ongoing processes. Power is expressed in a 
determinable set of actions that affect other ones. There is no inert power nor any 
“substance” called power. Power is always in action. Indeed, Foucault says that power 
relations could be considered an ongoing result of relations of confrontation: 
A relationship of confrontation reaches its term, its final moment (and the 
victory of one of the two adversaries) when stable mechanisms replace the 
free play of antagonistic reactions. Through such mechanisms one can 
direct in a fairly consistent manner and with reasonable certainty, the 
conduct of others.28 
 
Any relationship of open confrontation wishes to resolve into a power relationship, and 
power relationships can fail in one of two ways: when the persons directed by a power 
dynamic are reduced to complete impotence, or when a relationship of confrontation 
(re)emerges wherein the “governed” becomes an “adversary” aiming to set up a new way 
to govern--a new power relation.29 
This brings us to the second consequence of Foucault’s definition of power: 
situations of power only exist between agents. As we just observed, when one ceases to 
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act, we cannot identify a power relationship. There is an inalienable, and perhaps 
counterintuitive dependency of power on freedom. In contemplating power, one may be 
prone to thinking that when a person lives within a power dynamic, that person loses her 
freedom. Foucault would argue that power has an interest in preserving the ability to act, 
even encouraging actions from the governed, but only soliciting those actions designated 
appropriate. If one thinks of freedom as the ability to enact possibilities, to do some 
things and not do others, one needs to recognize that power simultaneously helps to enact 
possibilities and limits them. Power is often expressed in the designation of appropriate 
actions, the punishments for other actions, and the way actions are surveyed.  
Foucault thinks that we live out of a relationship toward our power situation. 
Power not only limits the possibilities available to each of us, it also supports the 
conditions that are essential for self-actualization. For example, Foucault writes, 
“[m]astery and awareness of one’s own body can be acquired only through the effect of 
an investment of power in the body.”30 One would not be able to achieve bodily 
awareness without public practices--exercises, muscle-building, aesthetic appreciation, 
sexual norms, discussions with others. All such public practices enter a domain 
established by power relations. Yet, as Foucault argues, “...once power produces this 
effect, there inevitably emerge responding claims [...] Power, after investing itself in the 
body, finds itself exposed to counterattack.”31 While this public domain is supported by 
in a situation of power, and we depend upon it to self-actualize, we also must take a 
stance regarding the power situation in which we find ourselves thrown (to borrow 
Heidegger’s parlance again). 
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In summary, each of us is born into a history and into particular forms of 
“government.” The temporality of such governing forms does not coincide with the time 
of our lives; language, norms, and social groups predate our birth and will, in all 
likelihood, exceed our death. These distinct temporalities sustain each other: such 
governing forms can only be what they are as we take them up, yet we depend upon them 
to provide the conditions for meaningful engagement. We are “governed” by the 
organization of a field of “appropriate” actions that solicits “normal” behavior, and 
creates a realm of deviancy. We are not merely objects studied by power relations, we 
also are the vehicles of it, and are capable of amending it. If we follow Foucault in 
scrutinizing these facts, we will begin to see that the social environment organized in 
various institutions is not politically neutral territory, but rather a situation of power 
organized in support of a style of sociality. We will also see that the actual forms of 
implementation for a power relation could vary dramatically. 
Now that we have a richer sense of power, I would like to return to discipline, the 
form of power that Foucault argues operates in the school and modern society at large. 
Foucault’s discussion of discipline continues to provide insight into the way that we are 
governed in the school. Discipline is not something that was invented by any single 
theorist or institution, but rather the unification and resonance of various techniques of 
control deployed across the breadth of distinctly modern social institutions: schools, 
hospitals, workplaces, prisons, military camps, etc. 
The ‘invention’ of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden 
discovery. It is rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different 
origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one 
another, [...] distinguish themselves from one another according to their 
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domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a 
general method.32 
 
Though Foucault is clearly reluctant to credit anyone with the invention of discipline, he 
argues that Bentham articulates the blueprint for disciplinary technology. Bentham 
provides the articulation in the design of the Panopticon. 
 
The Panopticon 
Before turning specifically to the Panopticon and panoptic effects, it is important 
to establish the historical and political setting in which these first emerged. Discipline 
and Punish provides a chilling, detailed examination of how modern power relations 
emerged within the broad social and historical movement in Europe toward democratic 
societies. Foucault argues that, in the historical movement away from monarchical 
society toward republican governments (and the conjoining discourses establishing new 
conceptions of legitimacy and political liberty), there was an under-recognized 
countermovement manifested in novel forms of bodily control. For example Foucault 
argues that “the Roman model, at the Enlightenment, played a dual role: in its republican 
aspect, it was the very embodiment of liberty; in its military aspect, it was the ideal 
schema of discipline.”33 Foucault traces a change in the methods of punishment that 
occurs over this period, and recognizes that techniques of coercion become the dominant 
model rather than the previous practice of spectacles of vengeance against transgressors. 
Coercion focused on methods for training the body “by the traces it leaves, in the form of 
habits, in behavior.”34 These techniques of coercion are defended in moral arguments and 
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codified in the legal systems, but Foucault is interested in understanding how they are put 
into practice. These developing techniques aim to constitute “the obedient subject, the 
individual subjected to habits, rules, order, an authority that is exercised continually 
around him and upon him, and which he must allow to automatically in him.”35 In order 
to craft these obedient subjects, new, diffuse, and broad-reaching methods for controlling 
the behavior of members of society were established in the peculiarly modern 
institutions.  
As a form of power, discipline is particularly effective because it begins to 
simultaneously expand the agency of the governed in terms of skills and possibilities, and 
to increase their domination by increasing the definition and adaptability of the limits of 
the field of appropriate action. Foucault recognizes that this double movement is the 
compelling force of disciplinary power, “[discipline] is ultimately dependent on the 
principle, which induces a genuinely new economy of power, that one must be able 
simultaneously both to increase the subjected forces and to improve the force and 
efficiency of that which subjects them.”36 Whereas previous power relations merely 
increased the subjection of the governed, or reduced that constraint to allow the capacities 
of the governed to organically improve, discipline begins with the principle that the 
capacities of the governed can improve whilst the efficiency of that which directs them 
improves. Discipline has a distinct character as a form of power by systematically 
developing the field of actions for the subjected, and the ability to act on this field. 
The model Foucault presents to conceptualize disciplinary power is an 
architectural construction for centralized inspection called “the Panopticon”--a design 
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originally crafted by Jeremy Bentham.37 Bentham imagined that the Panopticon would be 
particularly fitting for “penitentiary-houses,” yet it was described as “a new principle of 
construction applicable to any sort of establishment in which persons of any description 
are to be put under inspection,” including prisons, manufactories, asylums, poorhouses, 
hospitals and schools.38 The basic schematic is succinctly described by Foucault: 
Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition. We 
know the principle on which it is based: at the periphery, an angular 
building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows 
that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided 
into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they 
have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the 
tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one 
end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a 
central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a 
condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.39 
 
There are several aspects of this design that are worth examining in greater detail. Most 
significant for our purposes is the fact that within the Panopticon, each person’s time, 
space, and interpersonal relations are highly controlled beginning with the very 
architectural design. Indeed, Foucault is suggesting that this design alone accounts for a 
large degree of the governing of the target audience.40 
 In the Panopticon, time is broken into a series of planned durations--from 
determining the total duration that one is meant to spend within the structure to 
determining the minute activities of a single day. Regular shifts for the supervisors and a 
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predetermined period of enclosure for the observed determine the length of each person’s 
total stay within the structure. The duration of the custody of the observed would be 
determined in the social codes: inmates in prisons would have time proportional to the 
offense; patients in hospitals require time corresponding to the illness, and students are 
forced to remain in schools until a socially determined maturity. The supervisor's time 
spent in the institution is prepared in advance by employment contracts (another type of 
social code). Any variations throughout the day, week, or months follow prepared 
timetables. These timetables follow regular patterns, and create repetitive cycles of time. 
Furthermore, the Panopticon can be used for particular hours of the day or be 
implemented totally: “applied to [schools], you will find it capable of two very 
distinguishable degrees of extension:—It may be confined to the hours of study; or it may 
be made to fill the whole circle of time, including the hours of repose, and refreshment, 
and recreation.”41 Bentham seems to indicate that all of a person’s life activities could 
take place within a Panopticon. All these durations are fixed in advance, preventing 
anyone in the system from arbitrarily determining when they will act, and conditioning 
their very perception of time passing. 
 The Panopticon methodically prepares spatial arrangements within the central 
tower, within the cell, between these forms, and in relation to an exterior. Bentham 
imagines the tower has disguised entrances and exits, internal partitions between 
supervisors, and large windows (obscured from without by venetian blinds) facing all of 
the rooms. The cells are backlit by windows facing the outside, and have a massive 
window on the side of the cell facing the tower, which must remain unobstructed. The 
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cells are large enough for the necessary amenities (bed, toilet, etc.), but nothing beyond 
the essentials. Small cells allow the maximum number of rooms surrounding the central 
tower, which is set a secure distance from the cells and arranged so all of the cells are 
visible. The entire institution is for the most part closed in on itself, erecting walls around 
the ring of cells, and specifying the lines of approach and departure. 
The interpersonal relations organized within the Panopticon are twofold: those 
inside the Panopticon are separated from each other, and the supervisors can always see 
the supervised, but the supervised can never see the supervisors. There are no windows 
between the cells occupied by each prisoner, nor are there windows in the internal 
partitions in the tower. Such “lateral invisibility [...] is a guarantee of order.”42 
Specifically, lateral invisibility prevents disease from spreading between patients, 
prevents a plot from developing between inmates, or “if they are schoolchildren, there is 
no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time.”43 From the perspective of  a person in 
the cell, the only constant social relation is being on display for a central tower. Any 
other periodic social connections (instruction, punishment, chit-chat) are organized from 
the center and supervised. From the perspective of the tower, instead of a compact mass 
of bodies, there are a series of neatly ordered “cases” to witness and act upon. 
The interpersonal relations between supervisor and subject are organized to 
undermine the typical dyad between seen/seers and seers/seen. Typically, when one 
witness another, the observer can themselves be seen; the observed at least has the 
possibility to reverse the gaze. Additionally, under normal circumstances either person 
could leaving the situation, and exit from the other’s visibility. Within the Panopticon this 
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is impossible; the seers can never be seen and the seen can never hide. This effect is 
achieved by the design of the Panopticon. The cells are illuminated by light, and the 
window facing the tower must never be obstructed. In contrast, the windows of the tower 
are protected by venetian blinds, the entrance to the tower is outside the prisoner’s view, 
and moving into an observational position must not require the opening of doors or 
changing of lights -nothing to hint at the presence of a supervisor.44 The tower must 
always be visible from the cell, but the actual presence of any observer needs to be 
unverifiable for the observed. The audience should have no indication whether or not 
they are presently being watched, and constantly aware of the possibility of being seen. 
This structural element is responsible for “the major effect of panopticism: to induce in 
the inmate a state of conscious and perpetual visibility.”45 The perpetual possibility of 
being seen, Foucault argues, creates an “anxious awareness”46 of being observed that 
leads the observed to constrain his own action.47 
This last element, the anxiousness experienced by the perpetually observed, leads 
to the efficiency of the panoptic schema. The Panopticon could simultaneously reduce the 
number of supervisors, reduce the frequency of deploying physical force and violent 
intervention, while increasing the size of target audience and better controlling the 
behaviors of everyone supervised. This is because it enlisted the observed persons into 
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the policing practice. The Panopticon incentivizes the observed to self-police. Foucault 
insists: 
“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection.” 
 
The Panopticon ultimately establishes an internalization of the principles that surround 
the target audience. It causes the observed to cooperate with the values and norms of the 
institution, and to adopt the enforcement of these principles towards oneself. The anxiety 
of knowing one may constantly be judged, leads the condemned to flee into the safety of 
conformity, and actively remain there. The Panopticon gains in efficiency by penetrating 
into a person’s behavior: it is internalized. A few supervisors can produce the effect of 
normalization in a large audience as a result. 
The panoptic principles can even be carried to higher orders, by subjecting the 
supervisors to similar observation from a director, and then having inspectors or the 
public critique the directors. Within the central tower a director could spy on the 
supervisors. He could discreetly enter a central position in the tower, so that the 
supervisors would never know whether they were in fact under his gaze. He could impose 
and enforce a particular regime of “best practice” on his employees, and from his 
unverifiable observation he could ensure that it is being implemented.48 Furthermore the 
director himself could be supervised. “An inspector arriving unexpectedly at the centre of 
the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance, without anything being concealed from 
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him, how the entire establishment is functioning.”49 Such an inspector could deliver 
reports on the efficiency of the director and return with reforms, rewards or punishments 
as necessary. Indeed, any panoptic institution could be opened to any member of the 
society -an openness which ensures that “the disciplinary mechanism will be 
democratically controlled.”50 In this way, the Panopticon is able to apply its own 
principles to higher levels of supervision. A person in any position in the Panopticon 
must be aware of the unverifiable possibility of being subjected to the surveilling gaze. 
These orders of supervision help to elaborate a central tension that gives the 
Panopticon its particular character as a form of control: it makes the individuals inside the 
system vehicles for the application of power, and objects for a body of knowledge. The 
central positions and peripheral cells are linked by an uninterrupted supervision. This 
supervision is not only utilized to effectively administer judgments (in the form of 
punishments or rewards), it also leads to a record, the creation of a body of knowledge: 
“an uninterrupted work of writing links the center and periphery.”51 Supervisors take 
copious records of the collective events and the individual movements of those beneath 
them in the hierarchy. This allows experiments to be rigorously compared, permits 
slightly different distributions to be analyzed, and sanctions the “objective” classification 
of individuals. Foucault stresses the importance of this double movement:  
“what was new, in the eighteenth century, was that, by being combined 
and generalized, they attained a level at which the formation of knowledge 
and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular 
process. At this point the disciplines crossed the ‘technological’ 
threshold.”52 
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A perpetually refined classification of individuals and an ongoing analysis of the 
structures of segmentation are established in the Panopticon to record the fabrication of 
self-disciplined, useful individuals. These objects of knowledge and vehicles of 
enforcement could be the perfect cogs in a mechanistic, technologized vision of society.  
The hope that Bentham describes regarding the implementation of this design 
attests of its imagined import: 
What would you say, if by the gradual adoption and diversified application 
of this single principle, you should see a new scene of things spread itself 
over the face of civilized society?—morals reformed, health preserved, 
industry invigorated, instruction diffused, public burthens lightened, 
economy seated as it were upon a rock, the gordian knot of the poor-laws 
not cut but untied—all by a simple idea in architecture?53 
 
Bentham sees a utopian potential contained within this panoptic design. Instead of dark 
dungeons and torture chambers we could have bright, well-ordered institutions. If we 
spread the panoptic principles throughout the social body, the darkness that permits 
immorality could be replaced by a perpetual visibility, a total publicness, in which social 
norms would be perpetually enforced--even internally willed!  
Perhaps the Panopticon is well understood as a self-enclosed, ideal, utopian 
construct, but it still must not be considered a mere fantasy. Foucault offers the 
Panopticon as a generalized model for defining power relations. “[The Panopticon] is the 
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning abstracted 
from any obstacle [...] it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be 
detached from any specific use.”54 The Panopticon is the ideal type of a disciplinary 
institution, and requires “diversified application” in order to spread across society. Its 
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optic form must be translated as it is actualized, in order to accommodate resistances and 
match the particular behaviors desired.  
 Bentham insists that the Panopticon can be applied through a process of 
translation to any institution. This polyvalence is a key feature: “[i]t can in fact be 
integrated to any function (education, medical treatment, production, punishment); it can 
increase the effect of this function by being linked closely with it.”55 In any situation 
where one is dealing with a mass of bodies expected to perform a particular task or 
behave in a certain way, panoptic principles may be implemented to individualize, 
instruct, and supervise the crowd.  
Among the polyvalent applications imagined for the Panopticon is the instruction 
of schoolchildren. Foucault remarks, for example, that a “relation of surveillance, defined 
and regulated, is inscribed in the practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent 
part, but as a mechanism inherent to it and which increases its efficiency.”56 The power 
relations of the Panopticon are seamlessly able to merge with the practice of formal 
education.  
The Panopticon is the ideal model for disciplinary society. This structure 
meticulously segments the space, time, and interpersonal relations of the various 
supervisors and observed persons within it. The Panopticon is chiefly a machine for 
dissociating the typical reciprocity between seeing and being seen. This leads the target 
of disciplinary power to simultaneously become a vehicle for discipline, and an object for 
a centralized body of knowledge. The target is coerced into internalizing the norms and 
values of the institution. Furthermore, the Panopticon can provide the mechanisms for its 
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own enforcement, by subjecting the observers to the panoptic principle--ultimately 
leading to a publically supervised, yet largely self-enclosed institution. Bentham’s 
architectural design can be translated to increase the effects and efficiency of various 
social practices. I will now investigate how the panoptic form emerged and continues to 
operate in direct connection to the school. 
 
Disciplinary Schooling and Docility 
 Perhaps, at the end of our discussion of the Panopticon, the reader will think that 
we are very removed from any actual school. No school that I have ever witnessed is 
designed with teachers in a central tower and students locked into a ring of cells. Students 
in a public school are not entirely separated from their peers, and teachers are visible 
before the students. Administrators have their desks in front offices, not the dark center of 
a tower. Yet, Foucault argues that the Panopticon is a pure optic form, necessarily 
detached from any particular practice in order to provide an image or a blueprint of 
power relations devoid of any particular application.57 It is useful for demonstrating the 
constituent aspects of disciplinary power: segmentation/individuation, 
publicness/supervision, points of application/objects of knowledge, and 
internalization/self-application. These do remain features of the school. In fact, the 
Panopticon is partially inspired by disciplinary techniques developed in 18th century 
pedagogy. 
 Foucault argues that, beginning in the18th century, schools applied regulations 
and empirical methods to control and correct the behavior of the body in unprecedented 
ways. He acknowledges that “in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict 
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powers,” but the techniques that began to develop in schools in the 18th century had a 
distinct form and invasiveness not previously realized.58 The scale of control had never 
before been so expansive and exacting as to affect the movements, gestures, and attitudes 
of the body. It had never before been organized into a constant coercion that supervises 
the activity, in addition to the results, of bodily practices. Unlike previous methods of 
control, “[discipline] is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as 
possible time, space, movement.”59 The organization of time in the school, the design of 
spaces for students to occupy, and the instructed movements of the body are hereafter 
subjected to constant supervision and refinement. I will explore each of these elements in 
turn. 
The school segments time in several ways. First, there is a binary division of time 
that accompanies the school: the time of instruction and the time of mastery. This 
separates the totality of one’s life into two periods. “It is this disciplinary time that was 
gradually imposed on pedagogical practice -specializing the time of training and 
detaching it from the adult time.”60 By organizing social life into an explicitly educative 
period and a period of practice, the school begins to segment the totality of one’s life into 
two distinct durations.61 This division creates a standing danger that society may consider 
the former period to be the unique time of learning, covering-over the educative 
dimensions of the other vital parts of life (work, romance, hobbies, dying, etc.). 
                                               
58 Ibid, 136. 
59 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137. 
60 Ibid., 159. 
61
 Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Marion Boyars, 1970), page 26-28. Ivan Illich briefly 
analyzes this binary division and argues that the age-specific aspect of mandatory schooling is formative of 
our modern understanding of “childhood,” yet the justifications for age grouping in the school typically 
depend on under-examined premises regarding the essence of children. In effect, such arguments defending 
the school based on a concept of “the child” beg the question.  
  32 
Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the adult period of time and the time of childhood could 
lead students to consider their education as an arbitrary obstacle detached from their life 
experience. 
Disciplinary time also creates a plethora of fixed durations inside the practice of 
schooling. Graduation rituals identify the movement of students from one level to 
another. For example, I had a graduation ceremony between elementary school and 
middle school, between middle and high, upon completing high school, and soon upon 
completion of my B.A. Another duration is centered around grading: there are semesters 
(or trimesters, or quarters) into which instruction and examination is grouped. There is a 
detailed curricula that expects the student to learn (and the teacher to teach) the subject 
matter at a regular rate determined by the institution to produce the efficient development 
of skills and knowledge. “Draw up series of series; lay down for each individual 
according to his level, his seniority, his rank, the exercises that are suited to him. [...] At 
the end of each series, others begin.”62 The curricula introduces new material to students 
in a prepared unfolding. In my high school, for example, students generally studied 
biology during the freshman year, chemistry during the sophomore year, and physics 
following upon the completion of chemistry. The school creates periods of time centered 
around grading and advancing students through a prepared curriculum. 
Time reaches its most specialized organization in the form of timesheets or, in the 
parlance of the school, according to the class schedule. These are old devices with a 
legacy in the monastic tradition. Timesheets (and other cyclical schedules) serve three 
important methods: “[to] establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the 
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cycles of repetition.”63 The school day is separated by the ringing of bells to indicate as 
efficiently as possible to the entire student body a change in activities. The bell could 
mark the end of a long school day or the beginning of an exciting one. It could usher 
students out to the playground or into chemistry class. There no mystery in it, however, 
as regular and detailed timetables will have prepared students, teachers, and 
administrators for that day’s unfolding. Foucault gives the example of such a timetable in 
the Ecoles mutuelles in the early nineteenth century: “8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 
the monitor’s summons, 8.56 entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the children go to 
their benches, 9.04 first slate, 9.08 end of dictation, 9.12 second slate, etc.”64 Such a 
timeline regarding the entrance of students to school would not be out of place in the 
public schools that I attended, especially when morning assemblies were held (with the 
exception of designated prayer).  
Space in the school is first organized by the establishment of the campus. The 
premises are enclosed; visitors need to obtain special permission to enter, and if an 
unknown person entered the campus without permission it would likely cause a 
lockdown. The enclosed campus stands in contrast to the rest of the town by enforcing 
unique rules and regulations. The campus will typically enforce prohibitions on smoking 
and alcohol, for example. Foucault observes that the enclosed model was gradually 
imposed in “the colleges, or secondary schools, [...] and boarding appeared as the most 
perfect, if not the most frequent, educational regime.”65 With boarding the enclosure of 
students in the school could be made perpetual. While boarding is not the prevalent 
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model today, the enclosure of the campus is typically enforced even in the absence of 
students. 
Secondly, school establishes various functional spaces within the campus. These 
spaces have their own boundaries, means of supervision, norms, and purposes. The 
playground is bounded at the periphery to prevent the free-range of students, and is 
designed with smaller functional regions: the blacktop, the basketball hoops, the play-
structure, the open field, etc. The classroom erects its own boundaries (walls, windows, 
doors), and its own smaller regions (the front of the class is nearly sacrosanct space 
reserved for the instructor). Each person is expected to maintain a behavior appropriate to 
his or her current functional space. Young students may need to be reminded that they are 
not on the playground anymore if they return from recess and are unruly. Foucault 
indicates that these functional sites “were defined to correspond not only to the need to 
supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space.”66 The 
hallway, cafeteria, gymnasium, auditorium, and principal’s office are all different 
functional spaces; each serves a specific use: directing persons between places, eating, 
exercising, listening, or confessing. These spaces do not merely limit the activity of 
students (by preventing aberrant behavior), but entice activity from them (in the 
“appropriate” use of the space). 
The school even shapes the relationships between students and objects. Foucault 
describes “body-object articulations” that code the behavior of the body to pair with 
particular instruments. In the school, one is typically “paired” to a desk during 
instruction. The student is assigned a desk that they cannot leave without permission. He 
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is expected to sit upright, to keep his feet on the floor, to avoid fidgeting, and to keep his 
head erect. Through these behaviors, the student’s body is brought into correlation with 
the inanimate desk.  
Foucault gives the additional example of writing with a pen. “Good handwriting 
[...] presupposes a gymnastics--a while routine whose rigorous code invests the body in 
its entirety, from the points of the feet to tip of the index finger.”67 Teaching a student 
handwriting, involves coordinating the entire body. The writer needs to have the proper 
posture. She should plant her feet, square her shoulders, calm her breathing, fix her gaze 
to the page, keep her stomach from pressing into the table, surround the base of the pen 
with two fingers and the thumb, and repeat the necessary motions of the arm to produce 
letters. Disciplining the body is an essential precondition for these efficient gestures. 
 Quoting a work of pedagogy written by Jean-Baptiste de La Salle published in 
1701, Foucault uncovers an early articulation of similar postural demands for 
handwriting. La Salle also says that “the teacher will place pupils in the posture that they 
should maintain when writing, and will correct it either by sign or otherwise, when the 
change position.”68 Teachers need to supervise the activity of the body throughout the 
whole duration of the exercise. The operations of the body become the object of this new 
power relation, not merely the results. Production and signification are subjected, not just 
products and signs. This requires an efficient distribution of desks and the necessary 
instruments (writing utensils in this example), so that a teacher can see at a glance that 
the exercise is being carried out by all of the students in an orderly fashion. 
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Why describe in such detail the spatial, temporal, and instrumental relations in the 
school? Foucault argues that these produce “docile bodies.” Situating students in such an 
environment allows for the development of their capacities, while guaranteeing the 
students organize these skills toward the aims of the institution. “Discipline increases the 
forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in 
political terms of obedience).”69 Students obey the functions designated for each space, 
are habituated to skillful and proper behavior through the repetition and division of time, 
and pair with the instruments provided by the institution. These practices increase the 
aptitudes of the students in a controlled, observed setting, and the domination of them 
likewise increases. They cannot decide the ends of their activity nor meaningfully alter 
the environment in which they are situated. These useful, docile students are not yet the 
final product of a disciplinary regime, they are merely prepared for the interpersonal 
functions that make the Panopticon such an effective instrument of training. 
 
Correct Training of Students 
Foucault argues that the spatial, temporal, and instrumental relations in the school 
begin the process of disciplining students by increasing their capacities, while preventing 
them from acting upon the environment, or even facing it as a structure worth 
questioning. These aspects of the school actualize the panoptic form of segmenting space, 
time, and objects into a controlled field of activity that produces docility. Yet, we have 
only begun to introduce the interpersonal elements that Foucault argues are co-
responsible for the investment of behaviors into individual bodies. In the school, the 
interpersonal disciplinary techniques are largely executed according to two mutually 
                                               
69 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138. 
  37 
informing mechanisms: hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment. Hierarchical 
observation and normalizing judgment reproduce the panoptic form of surveilling and, as 
necessary, punishing the observed.70 Beginning with a discussion of observation and 
connecting it to judgment, we will begin to see how these processes normalize student 
behavior. 
 In order to efficiently understand and affect the student body, a system of 
observation needed to be established to penetrate the entire collective and to survey the 
behavior of each individual body. Ideally, this structural model would allow a single 
point to witness everything, as the tower at the center of the Panopticon watches the cells, 
but Foucault observes that in practice observation and recording needed relays.71 For this 
reason a pyramidal system of surveillance was established that ran from numerous 
thoroughly-observed students at the base to a few publicly accountable administrators at 
the top. In this process, social relations were vertically structured in tiers, with students at 
the base, teachers above them, and various administrators above the teachers. Each tier 
had ‘cases’ below them to watch and record, except for the students at the very base of 
the structure. Extrapolating from Foucault’s observations, we could extend this 
hierarchical pyramid to the national level today. Information collected about student 
performance at the base of this structure is destined for the highest government offices. 
Similarly judgments from these offices can carry back down the hierarchy to alter the 
practices surrounding individual students. The hierarchy of observation of the school 
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begins to be ordered into such a hierarchy in order to achieve a centralized understanding 
of the persons and practices within the institution. 
Awareness of the perpetual possibility of being observed by other bodies begins 
the process of disciplining. Everyone in the school system learns that they are supervised 
by those “above” them, and that they could be observed to a certain extent laterally and to 
a limited degree from “below.” The greater the possibility of being subjected to 
surveilling gazes, the greater is the person’s “anxious awareness of being observed.”72 
Students, at the bottom of the established hierarchy have this surveilling gaze most 
strongly positioned toward them. Feeling this anxious awareness in their bodies, those in 
the visible field do not cease acting altogether, but limit their behavior to what is 
considered appropriate by the institution.73 This project of centralized observation created 
a pyramid of distributed bodies and concerted gazes, so that the structure in-total made 
the school a place of perpetual visibility.74 
 The process of observation alone does not produce the disciplinary effect of these 
social relations, it is coupled with an incisive interpersonal penal mechanism: 
normalizing judgment. This judgment is accomplished through a polemic system of 
gratification and punishment. Rewards or punishments almost exclusively flow down the 
hierarchy and are limited in the other direction. Consider for a possible counterexample a 
students’ evaluations of their teacher at the end of a semester. One will observe that these 
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evaluations in themselves cannot affect the teacher; they merely serve as data for 
administrators to consider when reviewing teachers. Thus, even in student evaluations, 
data is being collected from those lower in the structure for persons above them. Students 
at the bottom of this hierarchy are constantly susceptible to judgment, teachers are judged 
regularly by peers and administrators, administrators are primarily susceptible to 
judgment from those higher in the constructed order, superintendents and the highest 
state offices are ultimately judged by the public. 
The judgments passed down in the institution are themselves objects to be 
observed and recorded. By recording the distribution of punishments and rewards, 
previously discontinuous acts are transformed into a field of behavior that is quantified 
and recorded, thus the school becomes  
...subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences, 
interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of 
behavior (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), 
of the body (‘incorrect attitudes, […] lack of cleanliness), of sexuality 
(impurity, indecency).75 
 
The collection of mass data of the student’s behavior transformed the school into an 
attentive, punitive environment. Many previously insignificant dimensions of student 
behavior could now be examined and targeted for exercises. Exercise is the prefered 
means of “punishing” those who are found deviant.76 A reduplicated insistence on the 
correct actions was favored over exacting revenge or demanding repentance. The 
extensive data of punishments and rewards allowed for the analysis of general trends, 
collective events, and widespread practices in the school. Thus, the observation and 
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judgment that spread through social institutions serves more than a negative function, it 
constructs standards of behavior. 
 The rigorous observation and judgment passed down in schools and other 
disciplinary institutions combine to create what a new “power of the Norm.”77 In short, 
the dual practice of observing and judging the students had the effect of normalizing 
them. By rigorously tracking and quantifying awards and debits assigned to individuals 
for their conduct, one can “objectively” differentiate between the individuals themselves. 
The mass data of this judging observation allows individuals to be compared to a 
‘whole’--the typical conduct of all. Individuals can then be differentiated according to 
their relationship to an average determined by the projects of the disciplinary institution. 
“The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the 
disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In 
short, it normalizes.”78 Students are systematically compared and differentiated according 
to how well they can take up the behaviors expected of them by those above them in the 
hierarchy. Abnormal, average, and exemplary acts are established “above” students. The 
students internalize these norms (typically without a conceptual understanding of this 
arrangement), as they are forced to behave better than a designated minimum threshold, 
to respect an average of achievement, and to strive for an optimum.79 As a result 
abnormal, average and exemplary individuals are constituted. Students develop their 
values within this normalizing environment. 
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 The normalization effect contributes to Foucault’s demand for a 
reconceptualization of the effects of power in general. Foucault thinks that power should 
not be conceptualize primarily in negative terms. It should not be said that power 
primarily excludes, represses, or censors. Although at times it does all of these, the 
primary effect of power is positive: “power produces; it produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained of him belong to this production.”80 By systematically treating each individual 
body in the school as an instrument for the exercise of training, and as objects to measure 
the success of training, disciplinary power actually fabricates the individual through a 
coordination of interpersonal, temporal, spatial, and object relations. This network of 
relations holds together, and counter-intuitively creates bodies that are seen as self-
standing, atomistic individuals. 
 
Summary 
 Following Foucault, I have argued that students necessarily live and develop their 
identities within a system power relations, and the school is a privileged site where 
disciplinary power shapes the behavior of the enclosed persons. The model of power 
relations that dominates in the school and in modern society at large is the Panopticon. 
This design organizes functional places, segments time into various periods, provides 
exercises with accompanying instruments, and enforces an interpersonal hierarchy in 
order to create docile bodies. Furthermore, it acts on these bodies through observation 
and judgment (especially during exercises and examinations) in order to normalize them. 
Docility and training create the characteristic effects of panopticism: individuation, total 
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publicness, internalization, and the intersection of points of application and objects of 
knowledge. 
Through a reading of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, I have demonstrated 
various ways that the school operates as a disciplinary institution. As any form of power, 
it creates a field of “normality” that conditions and limits the socialization of students. 
What distinguishes this form of power from previous power relations, is that it 
systematically increases the force of the subjected persons, and the forces that subject 
them. This is accomplished through a technologizing of power relations: transforming 
human behavior into an exact science to be both implemented and studied. The model for 
this form of power is the Panopticon--an architectural design that segments time, space, 
objects and the distribution of persons in order to enclose bodies under the perpetual 
possibility of judging gazes. The school enacts the form of the Panopticon by 
implementing spatial, temporal, and instrumental divisions to create “docile bodies.” 
These docile students are then interpersonally positioned at the base of a hierarchical 
pyramid of observation and judgment in order to train them efficiently into self contained 
individuals. In total, these practices normalize students -completing the internalization 
and self-policing characteristic of the Panopticon. 
 While Foucault masterfully discusses the ways in which our behavior is shaped by 
technologies of discipline, drawing upon a wealth of historical research, his argument 
depends upon some experiential presuppositions for which he cannot account. These 
presuppositions will be the my point of departure for the next chapter of the thesis. 
Foucault discusses the circulation of power, without discussing the experiences of the 
agents that become the vehicle for these relations. His analysis remains at the level of 
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social and historical practices, yet it appeals to certain capacities of the body that cannot 
be accounted for within the analysis. Foucault argues that power invests itself in an active 
body, but this activity is not explored from the perspective of the body. Why does the 
arrangement of space and time in the school produce docility? What is it like to develop 
habits of behavior? Why does the perpetual possibility of being looked at produce anxiety 
and alienation? Exploring this direction of questions seems essential for developing a 
complete picture of panoptic schooling. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
STUDENT EXPERIENCE AND THE SCHOOL 
 
 
 
“Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin [of silence], 
[...] and as long as we do not describe the action which breaks this silence. The spoken word is a 
gesture, and its meaning, a world.”81 
 
The concept of discipline effectively explains many of the internal relations of the 
school. It accounts for the school’s close segmentation and seriation of time, space, and 
movement. Disciplinary schooling cultivates functional places, organizes durations of 
time, pairs the body with instruments and supervises the activity of the body as it goes 
through exercises and examinations. The school organizes the activity of its students 
against a background of hierarchical observation and judgement. Foucault argues that all 
of these practices are co-responsible for “disciplining” the bodies of the enclosed persons. 
Such disciplined bodies are anxiously aware of the perpetual possibility of being 
observed, and exist in total publicness. The disciplined body is tied to its individuality 
and separated from others like it. This body is simultaneously an object for a field 
knowledge and a vehicle for the application of norms. The disciplined body internalizes 
the values of the institution and imposes them on itself. In sum, the disciplined body is 
docile and well-trained. 
Foucault argues for all of these positions through historical analysis on the level 
of social theory, but his argument depends upon numerous presuppositions of embodied 
behavior. The pairing of the body with instruments, the sedimentation of habits through 
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repetition, and the anxious awareness under the panoptic gaze are all bodily mediated 
practices that are necessary for discipline to function, but the origins of these practices 
are not yet justified within Foucault’s analysis. These unaccounted for forms of behavior 
are central to Foucault’s argument that disciplinary schooling promotes the institutionally 
sanctioned uses of the body thereby increasing its skills, and reduces the body’s 
autonomy and creativity thereby increasing its docility. Since Foucault’s analysis is 
focused on social practices and historical developments, he does not include a substantial 
analysis of embodiment which could account for these forms of behavior. I will be 
arguing that while social practices are surely constitutive of the norms of our time, our 
corporeality also delimits normality. 
Exploring these presupposed forms of behavior requires an approach that is 
attentive to the lived experience of the students. Phenomenology offers this approach. 
Phenomenology is both a movement in the history of philosophy and a method of 
describing phenomena in a lived, first-person manner. By examining some key 
phenomenological concepts, I will extend our understanding of disciplinary schooling 
into the lived experience of students. The phenomenologists I will consider in this chapter 
are Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; though these 
thinkers are not in complete agreement with each other, the concepts used in this 
reflection share a common commitment to describing practical human experiences. This 
critique enriches the foundations of Foucault’s argument, and allows us to identify the 
irreducible value of the concept of discipline. 
Before setting out on this new course, however, I should note that Foucault was 
highly critical of certain strains of phenomenology. He maintained that the movement 
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largely argued on the basis of a constituting consciousness or transcendental subject, 
which Foucault thinks is a fallacious starting point.82 In the beginning of Discipline and 
Punish he warns: 
[from disciplinary technology] various concepts have been constructed 
and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, 
consciousness, etc.; [from discipline] have been built scientific techniques 
and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism.”83  
 
Thus, Foucault thinks that the contemporary understanding of “the soul” (consciousness, 
subjectivity, psyche, and similar non-corporeal duplications of the body) is an effect of 
disciplinary training and supervision. “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political 
anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.”84 It is the history of this prison that Foucault 
wants to write in the first place. Since the concept of subjectivity has a history, the 
processes that create subjectivity need to be analyzed and arguments that presuppose a 
transcendental subject should be bracketed.85  
While there are strains of phenomenology that are guilty of presupposing a 
subject and transcendental categories, this criticism does not exhaustively apply to 
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phenomenology. The center of the phenomenological tradition is a commitment to 
describing the experience of actively belonging to the world. There are phenomenologists 
in this vein who argue that “[t]he real is to be described, and neither constructed nor 
constituted.”86 Detailed descriptions of the practices through we navigate the world 
provide a sufficient basis for philosophical reflection--without needing to appeal to a 
constituting consciousness or subject. For example:  
Heidegger describes what goes on in our everyday skillful coping with 
things and people and how we are socialized into a shared world. [...] [He] 
finds that the only ground for the intelligibility of thought and action that 
we have or need is in the everyday practices themselves.87 
 
Such descriptive, practice-centered phenomenologies avoid the major criticism Foucault 
raises against the tradition, and offer an approach that can explore the active engagement 
of the students. This type of phenomenology allows us to more fully grasp the roots of 
disciplinary pedagogy. 
 Foucault’s critical social theory and phenomenology both focus on the behavior 
of embodied actors, but they organize their observations with different ends in mind. 
Foucault undertakes a genealogical analysis of particular forms of behavior; he tries to 
understand their historical roots and political functions. In contrast, phenomenology 
examines how particular forms of conduct contribute to a personal relationship with 
meaning. More specifically, phenomenological analysis often focuses on understanding 
how particular styles of behavior contribute to personal ways of coping with his others 
and objects, thereby making oneself “at-home” in the world.88 Since discipline and 
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phenomenology have a similar commitment to studying behavior, they can be brought 
into a mutually informing analysis. 
There are at least three embodied practices presupposed for the functioning of 
discipline. Discipline relies on “body-instrument pairings.” Such a relationship to 
instruments is more fully explored through Heidegger’s conceptualization of the “ready-
to-hand,” a term for the way in which instruments are most closely encountered. This 
discussion reveals that, phenomenologically speaking, instruments become transparent to 
a skilled user deploying them to accomplish a task. Second, discipline presupposes that 
repetitive and seriated actions create habits in the bodies of the actor. Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion of the habit-body provides an account of the sedimentation of habits, and the 
body’s reliance on formed habits. Discipline also requires the production of an “anxious 
awareness” under the perpetual possibility of supervision.89 Sartre describes such an 
anxiety producing experience through “the Look” in Being and Nothingness. This 
concept helps to account for vulnerability and interdependence that accompanies 
embodiment.  
Exploring these presupposed behaviors opens another direction that needs to be 
explored to understand disciplinary schooling more fully--specifically, an examination of 
schooling should develop a concern for the students’ experience of making a home in the 
world. This direction of analysis and Foucault’s social theory appear to be mutually 
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informing, expanding the concept of discipline and uncovering its irreducible value for an 
understanding of modern pedagogy. 
 
Body Instrument Articulations 
 In chapter 1, I argued that disciplinary schooling pairs the body with instruments 
in the process of instructing them. A student’s assigned desk provides an example for 
how the student should direct his body. The student is expected to fix himself in place 
with his feet on the floor and head erect, mirroring the inanimate desk in which he sits. 
Additionally, the pen provides an example of the way that a coordinated movement needs 
to be drawn out of the entire body of the student in harmony with the utensil, in order to 
produce good handwriting. Foucault argues that the instruments and body of the student 
become paired in these forms of behavior, but does not explore the first person 
experience of such hitch-free deployment of equipment. Heidegger phenomenologically 
interrogates this very experience in Being and Time. 
 Heidegger observes that when a person uses an object, it is encountered in a way 
that is qualitatively different from examining it.  If a student examines her pen, for 
example, she can experience it as an object with many qualities. The pen may then be 
encountered as something colorful, smooth, and capable of a light clicking sound when 
the top is pressed. When using the pen, however, it is experienced very differently. In 
fact, when one deploys the pen in writing, it does not make sense to say that one 
encounters the pen as an independent object at all. Rather than as an independent object, 
the pen is encountered as something with which I write, in order to convey my thoughts, 
towards a more complete understanding of the subject matter, and for the sake of being a 
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writer.90 This is to say that the pen-in-use is encountered through a series of practical 
relations.  
Heidegger argues that instruments put to use are encountered in a manner that he 
calls “ready-to-hand.” Consider the example of hammering: 
The less that we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize 
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it 
become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is -as 
equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of 
the hammer.91 
 
While engaged in the skillful manipulation of equipment, it does not “appear” as an 
object, rather, it structures our involvement in our current task. The hammering, or 
writing is shaped by the instrument deployed, but that instrument does not appear to the 
writer or the hammerer while it is in use. While the instrument does not appear as an 
object, Heidegger argues that this is a “more primordial” way to encounter the 
instrument, because it reveals a rich practice to us. Only by using the instrument does the 
nexus of relations that is established by putting the pen into use emerge. 
This phenomenological account of equipment confirms that the body can pair 
with instruments, but it contains some new implications as well. Discipline delimits what 
type of equipment will be available for students to deploy, thereby controlling an 
essential factor of how the students will encounter meaning in the world. Yet equipment 
only takes on its function to the extent that it is deployed by the students. This would put 
a small, but important new emphasis on the pairing of the body with instruments: pairing 
with instruments is irreducibly a power of the student’s body. Foucault’s point of 
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emphasis is on the social relation. In the school, students are not free to select the 
instruments they will encounter, nor to deploy them in creative ways. They are meant to 
learn the “normal” way to deploy equipment and they are regularly punished for failing to 
do so. Yet, since skillfully pairing with equipment is a feature of our embodiment, a 
power structure cannot unilaterally proscribe the use of equipment or the lessons that will 
be gleaned by deploying it. We get a more complete picture of the body’s use of 
instruments by exploring the body’s development of habits, which Merleau-Ponty calls 
“the power [...] of altering our existence through incorporating new instruments.”92 
 
Sedimentation of the Habit-Body 
Discipline is a form of power that seeks to control individuals by the “traces” that 
it leaves in them, in the form of habits of behavior.93 Foucault argued that repetitive and 
seriated exercises of the body of the student will form habits. Once these habits are 
formed are they need to be resistant to changes, and directive of future projects if they are 
going to continue to discipline individuals. Yet, in order to say that exercises leave traces 
in the body, one must acknowledge that the body is capable of sedimenting forms of 
behavior into habit. This rhetorical shift provides new investigative opportunities. 
Foucault does not explore the significance of forming habits from the student’s 
perspective. Discipline relies on habitual traces in the body, but we have yet to explore 
what habits are and how they direct us. 
Merleau-Ponty provides significant insights into the sedimentation of habits and 
their significance in directing a person’s life. In Phenomenology of Perception, he locates 
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the habitual body as a significant part of one’s experience of the world. For example, 
each perceptive act uncovers a habitual body schema “behind” the perception.  
My perceptual act [...] benefits from work already completed, from a 
general synthesis constituted once and for all. This is what I express by 
saying that I perceive with my body or with my senses, my body and my 
senses being precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit 
or sedimented science.94 
 
Each particular perceptual experiences testifies to a synthesis that has already take place 
in the form of a sedimented system of habit. Habitual knowledge of the world is always 
already underway when one has a particular perception of the world. Consider, for 
example, waking up in a strange room. At first, I may attempt to see the familiar objects 
of my habitual sleeping space. This has me feeling disoriented. The strange room does 
not accept my habitual expectations of how my bed is oriented or where the exit is. 
However, once I adopt a more passive schema of expectations, objects emerge. At once 
the bed and the exit appear in clarity. This brief but common experience testifies to the 
existence of habitual expectations. 
 Habits are patterns of bodily movement that demonstrate the general frameworks 
of meaning with which I engage the world. The example of handwriting above 
demonstrated that instruments become phenomenologically transparent in our involved 
activity; they do not appear as objects in my experience. In such habitually involved 
activity, one will notice that my body does not appear as an object either. When writing 
with the pen, the ongoing task requires movements of the instrument and movements of 
my body, yet as I write, I do not need to constantly consider the positioning of my arms 
or movements of my wrists. Similarly, playing a sport requires a dynamic set of motor 
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skills that, once developed, can be utilized unreflectively. Such a set of skills even open 
opportunities for engaging in the sport in ways that were previously inaccessible.95 By 
establishing a habit, I institute “a certain style of motor responses” for engaging with the 
world.96 This style of motor responses accounts for the familiarity of where my limbs are 
and how instruments should be manipulated as I accomplish habituated tasks. 
The temporality of habit presents the complicated relationship between our body 
and our world. Habits have a structure of expectation that takes the future as its referent, 
and habits are historically developed and reenact a past.97 As indicated in the example of 
waking in an unfamiliar room, I expect a particular orientation of objects around me 
because of my habits of waking and beginning my day. Such expectations direct me 
toward my immediate future, but they also take previous experience as their guide. If I 
am strongly habituated to waking in a particular place and then I rearrange my room, I 
may experience the same “disappointed” expectation multiple times over the course 
several days. This habit may even require deliberate effort to be reformed into a 
harmonious system between my body and my new room. 
Merleau-Ponty takes an even more dramatic example to illustrate the temporality 
of habit in the form of phantom limbs. The phantom limb names a phenomenon where an 
amputee experiences sensations from a removed limb, and may even act as though the 
limb were still there. Merleau-Ponty argues that while the “actual body” of the patient has 
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been altered, the “habitual body” may still need time and practice to adjust.98 During this 
period of transition, some of the motor responses that are contained in the habits of the 
person are no longer useful for his actual body, yet they can still be solicited from the 
amputee. If a man has lost his leg, for example, and there is a knock on the door, the man 
may try to raise and answer it, only to fall. “At the same moment that my usual world 
gives rise to habitual intentions in me, I can no longer actually unite with it, if I have lost 
a limb.”99 His attempt to stand is disappointed because his physical body cannot unite 
with his habits. This example of a phantom limb demonstrates that habits not only guide 
our expectations of the world, but reenact a world that gave rise to the habit.100 
Habits are developed motor responses that create a skillful system between our 
bodies and our world. They direct our actions by articulating possibilities for the future, 
and reenact our past by creatively deploying the world that gave rise to the habit. 
Foucault’s account is supported insofar as habits demonstrate stability over time and 
direct us towards our future through their embodied expectations. Yet, Foucault’s account 
needs to be qualified insofar as habits are open-ended. Habits do not unilaterally 
proscribe how the body will act, or how the world will appear, and habits can always be 
adjusted. Indeed the body must constantly adjust habits even in the most mundane 
activities, because the current situation in which they are used never perfectly 
corresponds to the world in which the habit formed. Additionally, habits are open-ended 
because they make further dimensions of meaning available which can lead to the 
creation of new habits. Learning to write, for example, can lead to increasing articulate 
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levels of thought and action, even into the articulation of unforeseeable ideas or ways of 
writing. 
Foucault identifies a politics within the formation of habits that seems to be 
lacking in Merleau-Ponty’s account. Students do not develop habits in a politically 
neutral space. The school imposes exercises and corrective punishment on students to try 
to ensure the “proper” development of habits, and puts students through examinations to 
simultaneously test the students and the school’s methods. I put the word proper in quotes 
here because the disciplinary school is able to determine what the “proper” development 
of habit is, and what is improper. After all, discipline “must have its own functioning, its 
own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it must fix its own norms, decide its 
own results.”101 Many of the students’ habits are acquired through this learning machine: 
the disciplinary school. Yet, as I have argued, habituation is a power of the student, 
appropriated for discipline, and since it is open-ended it can lead the students in 
directions unforeseen by the disciplinary school. Since habits are developed under 
panoptic observation, we must examine the experience that such surveillance has on the 
body, through Sartre’s “The Look.” 
 
The Look of the School 
The effectiveness of disciplinary schooling is predicated on the anxiety students 
feel under the perpetual possibility of a surveilling gaze. This anxiety compels the 
students to self-police. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that experiencing the 
look of another person can result in anxiety and modify a person’s conduct. As a 
phenomenologist, Sartre is more concerned with describing the mundane way that actors 
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experience a foundational relation to others, than in constructing a more traditional 
argument surrounding the problem of other consciousnesses. He finds evidence for our 
fundamental relation to others in an experience called “the look.” While “looking” is a 
familiar word, as discipline was earlier, Sartre brings a pregnant, technical meaning to the 
common word. 
 Sartre does not explicitly define “looking,” but rather develops a use for the word 
in the course of his descriptive account. One point that I will distill about the term, at this 
juncture, is that perceiving and looking are interrelated but heterogenous. Sartre says, 
“Every look manifest toward me is manifested in connection with the appearance of a 
sensible form in our perceptive field.”102 This indicates that a perceptible form is a 
necessary condition for a look to be manifested toward me. In order for me to experience 
the look, I must perceive a form that is capable of looking at me; I perceive an Other.103 
Sartre argues that this form that I perceive looking-at me can manifest in many ways; the 
“eyes” of the Other need not be the ocular globes in their head, but could be given in the 
perception of a rustling of branches, a light shining into the dark, or an artifice to be 
avoided. These forms need not refer to the actual physical eyes of a person, but “in 
themselves they are already eyes.”104 The perception of such forms may coincide with the 
experience of being “looked-at.” 
 Sartre continues this line of argument by indicating that the appearance of this 
sensible form is not a sufficient condition for “the look.” In order for me to experience 
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the look, I also need to perceive this sensible form as “eyes” looking at me, in contrast to 
an object to be appreciated by me. The way that a thing appears to me, then, is 
distinguished into at least two styles: something can appear to me by my looking at it and 
something can appear to me by my being looked-at by it. My experience of looking 
presents entities to me as objects and instruments, while my experience of being looked-
at recognizes that I can also be seen as an object and an instrument. Sartre argues that 
these experiences are mutually excluding, or at least doubts the possibility of 
simultaneously perceiving in the mode of looking and in the mode of being looked at.  
I should willingly say here: we can not perceive the world and at the same 
time apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the other. 
This is because to perceive is to look at, and to apprehend a look is not to 
apprehend a look as an object in the world [...]; it is to be conscious of 
being looked at.105 
 
The meaning of the look, then, is that I am seen, that I am a thing that can be seen.106 The 
look is the first appreciation of the body’s presence in the world as another object, as 
something observable, vulnerable, finite, and manipulable. The look of another teaches 
me that there is a irreducible part of my being that I do not constitute or fully know, 
precisely because it is not experienced as existing for me. It exists for others. And yet, 
since it is not necessary that someone actually rests behind the “eyes” that I experience 
looking at me in order for me to experience myself as looked at, Sartre argues that the 
look is a “pure reference to myself.” It is a reference that I make to my “being-for-
others.” 
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 The most involved description of an experience of the look that Sartre gives is the 
example of a man caught while jealously looking through a keyhole. Imagine that I am 
alone in a hallway when I hear friends talking in the next room. I position myself in front 
of the door and gaze into the keyhole in order to spy on the events taking place in the 
next room. While alone in this example, Sartre stresses, I am functioning on the level of a 
non-thetic self-consciousness.107 This means that I am not qualifying and reflectively 
considering my acts, I am nothing other than my actions. I am occupied with the process 
of utilizing the keyhole (the means) to witness the spectacle occurring across the portal 
(his end). I feel jealous, and I organize the hallway and the keyhole in order to witness 
the spectacle; at the same time, my jealousy is purely the recognition that there is 
something to be seen through the keyhole. This double relation of the seer and the world 
around him is a “situation.” In Sartre’s philosophy, situation is the system of inverted 
determination (the man’s jealousy organized the world around him, and the world around 
him called forth his jealousy) according to which non-thetic experience is shaped. I am 
pressed to the keyhole when suddenly I hear footsteps down the hallway! 
 At hearing the footsteps, I experience myself as a thing seen. The instrumental 
complexes that I was freely organizing now emerge as being available to another. The act 
of gazing through the keyhole now immediately has the meaning it previously held 
(access to the conversation on the other side) and a meaning that appears as being for this 
other (a taboo act of spying on others). My actions have an “outside” to be witnessed, and 
do not exist as purely my own. With the look, suddenly there is an aspect of my being 
which I experience as being inescapably outside of me: it exists for this other. “[B]ehold 
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now I am somebody! [...] I am he in the midst of the world in so far as he escapes me.”108 
My ongoing non-thetic involvement now has a way of recognizing that it is a being. 
Sartre argues that, without the look, the being that I am (the self) can only be posited as 
an object by the reflective consciousness; I can mine my past decisions to try to answer 
the question “what am I?”, or I can look to the future to answer this question by 
promising to be something.109 With experience of being looked at, the non-thetic 
consciousness gains a way of experiencing its being, through the possibility of being 
appropriated by the other’s projects. The being that is engaged in the interruptive moment 
of being looked at proposes only a limited answer to the question “what am I?,” because 
it answers with a being that is only partially mine; I am it, but it is not for me.  
Now that I have been seen, I perceive the hallway and my possibilities differently. 
I begin enacting some of the possibilities that surround me, but now these possibilities 
emerge “in the presence of the other,” as though I remember the rupture that the look 
brought to my situation.  
These few remarks will become more concrete if we recall an experience 
familiar to everybody: if we happen to appear “in public” to act in a play 
or to give a lecture, we never lose sight of the fact that we are looked at, 
and we execute the ensemble of acts which we have come to perform in 
the presence of the look; better yet we attempt to constitute a being and an 
ensemble of objects for this look.110 
 
When I am caught peeping through the keyhole, I still experience the possibility of 
looking through it, of running away, or of hiding in a dark corner, yet now all these 
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possibilities immediately contain an aspect that is mediated by the person looking at me. 
So, while there are still numerous actions available to me, I recognize that these potential 
acts will be seen and interpreted by this other, and insofar the other transcends my 
actions. Deciding my personal projects now occurs in the presence of the other’s look. 
Whatever I do, I now do as a thing seen and not merely as a seer. 
“The look” vividly describes the experience of being looked at. Much like the 
panoptic gaze, it can affect the body with anxiety and tension. Neither Foucault’s 
panoptic observation, nor Sartre’s look requires the actual presence of an observer; both 
are ultimately relations that I make to myself. Furthermore, in the presence of the look, 
the spatial experience of perceived is altered to take into account the values of the 
supposed watcher. By framing the look as an embodied experience, Sartre’s description 
fills a gap in Foucault’s work. It provides a more complete defense for the conformity 
and self-policing that Foucault argues is central to the efficiency of discipline but never 
elaborates upon. 
 Sartre examines the look for its existential functions, whereas Foucault examines 
the gaze for its historical and political significance. If we follow the existential emphasis, 
the gaze folds into the issue of making a home in the world. To make this turn, we would 
need to follow Sartre in examining how the gaze informs a person’s mode of being with 
others. For the purposes of my argument, I would suggest that the look illustrates the 
fundamental dependency that each of us has to each other, namely that “being-seen 
constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my freedom.”111 In 
being-seen, I am able to recognize the vulnerability that necessarily accompanies 
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embodiment in a world with others. How one faces this vulnerability would reveal its 
existential meaning.  
 One critical difference for the panoptic gaze is that it tries to maintain the school 
as a “public” place, so that the student is constantly aware of the possibility of being 
looked at. These constant interruptions could amplify the feeling of vulnerability Sartre 
describes. Additionally, since the Panopticon tries to keep the student in the position of 
the person looked-at, the student cannot reverse the experience of the gaze and evaluate 
the structure that individualizes him. “He is seen, but does not see; he is the object of 
information, never a subject in communication.”112 This keeps the student from 
experiencing the responsibility that accompanies the gaze. In Sartre’s formulation, we are 
vulnerable to the freedom of the others around us, and they are vulnerable to our 
freedom. The Panopticon dissociates this reciprocity. We are vulnerable to its gaze, but it 
is not vulnerable to ours. 
 
Summary 
 I argued that Foucault’s concept of discipline was insufficient as long as it did not 
account for the behaviors of the student necessary for it functioning. This critique of 
discipline from the tradition of phenomenology helps to establish forms of student 
engagement in the school that could not be the result of an investment of power. These 
forms of behavior largely supplemented Foucault’s argument, rather than refuting it. Yet, 
they do provide some important qualifications for discipline. This critique helps to 
demonstrate the role of individual agency in what could otherwise appear to be the mere 
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interplay of forces--of power and resistance dialectically dueling over the history of the 
society. Phenomenological analysis instructs us that the student’s body is not a lifeless 
object, inscripted with the significances of its culture, nor is it a soul pre-existing the 
cultural institutions that provide a stock of meanings for the body to deploy.  
Yet, the phenomenological tradition is insufficient for political analysis as long as 
it cannot address the situations of power within which persons develop and maintain their 
bodies. Judith Butler, recognizing the importance of both of these levels of analysis, 
argues that  
[T]he relation between acts and conditions is neither unilateral nor 
unmediated. There are social contexts and conventions within which 
certain acts not only become possible, but become conceivable as acts at 
all. The transformation of social relations becomes a matter, then, of 
transforming hegemonic social conditions rather than the individual acts 
that are spawned by those conditions. Indeed one runs the risk of 
addressing the merely indirect, if not epiphenomenal, reflection of those 
conditions if one remains restricted to a politics of acts.113 
 
The description of embodied activity uncovered by reading Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Sartre, and Steinbock demonstrates the significance of acts by the students necessary for 
the concept discipline to be coherent. Yet, recognizing the activity of the body 
presupposed for schooling to take place does not proscribe a liberatory pedagogy. One 
would need to turn again to social critique, to an analysis of the conditions within (and 
often against) which students develop a home, in order to determine the liberatory 
possibilities latent in the current practice. Perhaps this is the irreducible contribution of 
Foucault’s analysis, the understanding of normality in any society is predicated on the 
actions of those within it, but it is not reducible to those actions. 
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 So, while in Chapter 1, I argued that discipline continues to function as a unifying 
power structure in schools and that it constructs the norms within which students learn, in 
chapter 2, I have argued that the corporeality of students also participates in the 
establishment, support, and transformation of norms. Indeed, Foucault’s analysis of 
discipline seemed incomplete by failing to investigate the features of embodiment 
necessary for the disciplining of behavior to occur. Now we have two directions to 
approach schooling: it is a process by which society invests habits of behavior into bodies 
and it is a process by which bodies deploy modes of behavior to interact with a 
meaningful world. An interesting consequence of the analysis at this point is that these 
directions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, each seems to be true, and a nuanced 
understanding of schooling would recognize that analyzing the school from both of these 
directions creates a mutually informing understanding of the institution. Yet, these 
aspects of the school can chafe against each other. 
 Disciplinary schooling amounts to an appropriation of fundamental ways that 
students engage with meaning, in order to promote docility. Students develop meaningful 
body practices as they navigate the school, yet they perform these practices under a 
situation of duress that severely limits their ability to creatively engage with their 
world.114 Foucault’s assessment of discipline is irreducibly valuable for its elaboration of 
the political context in which students develop relations to instruments, develop habit for 
navigating the world, and develop relations to their visibility before others. Our 
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existential development in the school is best understood as a responsive strategy 
necessary to safeguard meaning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
DANGERS OF DISCIPLINARY SCHOOLING 
 
 
 
“A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is 
that from which something begins its presencing.”115 
 
 Having examined the disciplinary functions of the school and the 
phenomenological underpinnings of that disciplinary power, it is now is worthwhile to 
the definition of education proposed by John Dewey. In chapter 1, I argued that many 
internal relations in the school can be understood through the organizational concept of 
discipline. This was revealed to be a technology of power that aims at creating docile and 
useful individuals. Discipline invests habits into the bodies of individuals, accounting for 
the re-creation of social practices and values. Strictly speaking, this fulfills the social 
definition of education as the communicating of habits of thinking, doing, and feeling in 
order to sustain the life of the group. In chapter 2, I argued that students need to enact 
several presupposed forms of conduct if discipline is to function. These forms of conduct 
revealed ways that students experience meaning in their lives, and open new areas of 
meaning to engage. As we saw in the introduction, this accords with Dewey’s definition 
of education at the individual level as growth: the broadening and deepening of 
experience. 
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 This definition emerges again in our discussion here so that I can make a limited, 
but important point: education happens in the school. Even when the school is understood 
as a disciplinary technology that can fix its own standards and decide its own results, 
there is evidence of an educative dimension that befits Dewey’s definition. Yet, Dewey’s 
model for education looks radically different from the form of education uncovered by 
Foucault. This difference is a result of the different aims of their investigations. Foucault 
does not provide a normative concept of education or schooling, but this is precisely what 
Dewey invents. His normative system is incorporated into his understanding of growth: it 
is its own end. Education, then, should not be understood as a movement toward a fixed 
goal. When this happens “the adult environment is accepted as a standard for the child. 
He is brought up to it.”116 Rather than educating students into a particular environment, 
Dewey argues that we must educate students to be the shapers of their environment. This 
allows Dewey to argue that while education surely still happens in the disciplinary 
school, “the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for 
continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.”117 In the 
first regard, disciplinary schooling does not concern itself with cultivating the desire for 
continued growth in students. In the second, it precludes opportunities to make such 
desire effective, unless the desired growth conforms to the aims determined by the 
institution. Dewey’s model for education requires that students become co-partners in the 
shared activities of the group. This requires opportunity to transform social institutions, 
not merely to be transformed by them.  
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 Since education is this ongoing social process, Dewey argues for a particular ideal 
for society in order to establish criteria for educating. Dewey argues that a democratic 
ideal for society best corresponds to the principle of growth as its own end. Democracy is 
“more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living.”118 This 
mode of living is identifiable through two factors in the society. In the first, a democratic 
society promotes numerous and varied points of common interest between its members, 
allowing them to form greater recognition of their interdependence. In the second, the 
democratic mode of living promotes the freer interaction between social groups within 
society. In these organic interconnections between persons and groups, society changes. 
Dewey argues that “[a] society which makes provision for participation in its good of all 
its members on equal terms, and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions 
through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic.” This 
second criterion is the more significant in light of our discussion of disciplinary 
schooling. Discipline does not secure flexible readjustment of its institutions, but rather 
uses institutions to try to efface differences in the society. Discipline is then antithetical 
to a democratic society. 
 Personal and social growth is the end of education that Dewey advocates, but 
disciplinary pedagogy organizes extensive scientific means to regulate growth and make 
it useful for the panoptic machinery. Through its segmentation of time, space, and 
movement, discipline attempts to solicit the skillful growth of abilities in students without 
allowing them to organize their faculty of growing toward their own ends. The 
Panopticon supplies the means for its own measurement and reform, making it highly 
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resistant to transformation by any particular member of the society. Students are 
especially discouraged from transforming the disciplinary system: it resists their gaze, it 
appropriates their habituations, and it delimits their instruments, time, and space. In the 
exhaustive system that discipline establishes, society is encouraged to tacitly reproduce 
the contemporary power structures. In disciplinary pedagogy, it seems as though our 
bodily power to grow in open-ended ways is limited and even appropriated within the 
ends of the institution. By way of concluding, then, I would like to further explore the 
danger that is implicit in disciplinary pedagogy by exploring the ends that this technology 
pursues. 
 
The Danger of Disciplinary Technology 
 Foucault argues that discipline is a technology for organizing power relations. By 
phenomenologically questioning technology, we may be able to elucidate the danger of 
disciplinary schooling. Heidegger can guide us into this kind of reflection on technology 
through his essay “The Question Concerning Technology.” It is even possible that 
Foucault’s use of technology has Heidegger’s discussion in mind. In an interview, 
Foucault once said,  
Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher… I still have 
the notes I took while reading Heidegger - I have tons of them! - and they 
are far more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My whole 
philosophical development was determined by my reading of 
Heidegger.119 
 
If Heidegger did have this profound of an influence on Foucault’s philosophy, then the 
use of the word technology to describe disciple should not be taken lightly. Examining 
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the disciplinary school in light of the dangers that Heidegger argues are inherent to the 
way mankind currently uses technology may help us into the normative criticism of 
discipline begun by returning to Dewey. 
 In modern society we are inundated technology, and yet it can be difficult to step 
back and consider the term “technology” itself. If we begin with the example of a 
technology, like my computer, we may observe that is a tool on which I can type in order 
to write an essay (among other possible uses). Generalizing from the experience of 
particular technologies, like computers, we could say that “technology” is artificial 
equipment that assists in its user’s pursuits. It is a means of applying particular tools and 
practices to the ends determined by the user. The school, according to this understanding 
of technology, is a particular set of tools (teachers, classrooms, books) and practices 
(lectures, examinations, discussions, rituals) organized toward the society’s goal of 
educating the students. Two elements of our current definition are that technology is 
anthropocentric (human-made and organized for human aims) and instrumental (a means 
for accomplishing projects). 
Heidegger’s “Question Concern Technology” brackets the assumed 
anthropocentric and instrumental definition of technology, in order to question what 
modern technology does in its own right. Our natural attitude assumes technology is 
merely a means to human ends, but such things as means and ends properly belong to 
causality. Understanding technology, then, is tied to our understanding of the relations of 
cause and effect. Reflecting on Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes, Heidegger notices 
that whenever we are concerned with instrumentality--the means of something, our 
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concern is situated within the broader and more primordial interest in causality. The 
instrumental aspect of technology corresponds to Aristotle’s efficient cause.120  
All of Aristotle’s causes are possible accounts for what created an effect. If we 
wanted to respond to the question “why is that statue in the temple?” using the four 
causes Aristotle identifies, we would reply that the marble (material cause) was shaped 
into Athena’s likeness (formal cause) through the art of sculpting and the sculptor’s effort 
(efficient cause) in order for the people to worship (final cause). The means leading to the 
effect--the efficient cause--is but one of the causes united and co-responsible for any 
effect. Uniting all causes, according to Heidegger, is the presencing of the nonpresent. 
Aristotle’s four causes taken together provide the broadest description for the way entities 
appear. Causality, then, denotes the revealing of entities, in Heidegger’s terms it brings-
forth beings. Reflecting on the greek word for technology, “techne,” Heidegger finds 
evidence for his regrounding of technology within revealing because this ancient Greek 
word meant: “it reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not lie here before 
us.”121 The meaning of “techne” was more expansive than the meaning carried in the 
modern word “technology.” It named the activity of the craftsman, but also “the arts of 
the mind, and the fine arts.”122 Heidegger goes on examine this reduction of meaning. 
 Modern technology is a particular style of revealing. It is no longer characterized 
as techne, which denoted the broadest sense of bringing beings forth. Instead, technology 
                                               
120 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle, edited 
S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C Reeve, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2011), Book V, Chapter 
2. 
121 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, 
edited by David Farrell Krell, (London: Harper Perennial, 1977), 319. Heidegger repeats this observation in 
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” emphasizing the relationship between the word “technique” and “techne,” 
we still talk about techniques in art, thought, and work, but technology only applies to the latter. 
122 Ibid., 318. 
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reveals being in a manner Heidegger calls “challenging-forth.” Whereas humans have 
always used technology to set things in order, the ability of technology to set the world in 
order was once much more limited. The technology of the craftsman enabled the 
discovery of a valuable resource lying dormant in a block of wood, but the technology of 
the modern era can calculate the value of the resources dormant in whole forests. Nature 
is now challenged to show its utility and to reveal itself as equipment.123 Technology 
challenges all entities in the world to appear as something “standing reserved” to be used.  
Heidegger is arguing that technology is better understood as a movement, an 
impulse that brings the earth into an efficient, self-perpetuating system. The guiding 
principle of this system is efficiency; it aims “toward driving on to the maximum yield at 
the minimum expense.”124 As the “standing-reserve,” entities are revealed according to 
their availability and utility, and are increasingly ordered according to this logic of 
efficiency. Heidegger argues that this ordering of the world is the end of technology. It 
serves no greater purpose than bringing more entities into the system. 
 Heidegger takes the directive power of the logic of efficiency a step further, by 
arguing that the pressure for maximal efficiency also orders the intersections between 
entities that are “standing-reserve.” He illustrates this through the example of the Rhine 
in Germany. A hydroelectric dam can be laid across the river in order to make its motion 
dispense electrical energy. Now the river is revealed as a power supplier, and appears to 
be something under our command. Surely the river can also be witnessed as standing 
                                               
123 In Being and Time, the first modes of encounter examined are experiencing beings as “ready-to-hand” 
and as “present-to-hand.” Objects that cannot be skillfully used by a Dasein stand before or opposed to us, 
they are present-at-hand. A way of interpreting the danger of technology is that it destroys these separate 
ontological encounters. 
124 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 321. 
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against us as it has revealed itself to earlier generations, as an object present before us? 
Provocatively, Heidegger claims that this is possible “in no other way than as an object 
on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.”125 The style 
with which the Rhine is standing reserve may be different when it is dammed or made 
into a vista, but the logic is upheld. The river is challenged to reveal its utility (whether as 
a scenic view or as a power supplier) and the people are guided to be the instrument that 
orders the actual into the standing reserve. The example of the dam illustrates that 
“challenging-forth” runs along its own interlocking paths, so that various modes of 
“standing reserve” may intersect, but such intersections are still ultimately guided by the 
logic of efficiency.126 It may be useful to have a river as a beautiful vista, and it may be 
useful to have the river as a power supplier, but whether the river is commanded to stand 
reserved in one form or the other still depends on the logic of maximizing efficiency. 
 Seeing how technology creates the standing reserve, Heidegger argues that 
technological activity is not set to human ends, but to its own. The role of humanity in 
“challenging-forth” is to mistakenly think that technology fits our purposes and is under 
our control, while we embrace the technological drive to order the actual evermore into 
the standing reserve. The lack of recognition of technologies autonomous movement 
                                               
125 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 321. 
126 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). Anne Dufourmantelle makes a strikingly similar point when responding to one of 
Derrida’s lecture courses in Of Hospitality. Of many nuanced problems posed by the concept of hospitality, 
Derrida opens the seminar warning that the question that the foreigner will address “is nothing less than the 
question of the statesman, of man as a political being” (13). Dufourmantelle responds, “Yet in our period 
exhibiting man as a political being strikes a note of sovereign insolence, to the extent that our culture seems 
to be in the process of making the political vanish completely into theatrical effect- [I am speaking] about 
the very act constitutive of the political, and which, since the beginning, has been the only act by which one 
or a number of persons, by virtue of the power conferred on them by others to represent them, can hinder, 
accomplish, or suspend an economic process by referring it to other values which are not quantifiable ones” 
(72). Increasingly, it is impossible to appeal outside technological logic (the logic of the quantifiable) to 
alter or preserve economic processes. Different strands of challenging forth may come into conflict, but 
appeals outside of it are increasingly impossible. 
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subsumes our efforts under its chains.127 Humanity is the one called into this form of 
revealing, and this can be the supreme danger of technology:  
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, 
but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of 
objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he 
comes to the brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point 
where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, 
man precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as 
lord of the earth.128 
 
The supreme danger of this form of revealing is that it may dogmatically expel other 
forms of knowledge and bring all beings, even mankind, appear purely as the standing-
reserve: maximally available for use, efficient, and set to no other end than more deeply 
ordering the world. 
 Foucault provides an analysis of the form of technology that is most directly 
concerned with ordering humanity into standing-reserves: discipline. The chief effect of 
disciplinary power is the production of truth. As Foucault indicated: “it produces reality; 
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production.”129 Producing truth in Heidegger’s 
language is “revealing that which does not show itself”--it is techne. Discipline is a 
technology set to ordering students into “the standing-reserve” by trying to create 
maximally skilled, maximally docile bodies. Foucault’s examination of discipline 
uncovers the power structures that are preeminently concerned with producing the 
“standing-reserve” out of mankind. 
                                               
127 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, page 358. Sartre says that a person is a slave to the extent that he is an 
instrument of possibilities which are not his own: “In so far as I am an object of values which come to 
qualify me without my being able to act on this qualification or even know it, I am enslaved.” 
128 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 333. 
129 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194. 
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 Even if technology has an autonomous direction, it is a movement in which we 
actively participate. How we relate to the movement of technology is an interesting issue 
for Heidegger. He thinks that technology should not be merely embraced nor blindly 
rebelled against; rather, by recognizing the essence of technology, one can place 
technology within the proper bounds--using its form of ordering of the world as a source 
of meaning, but not as the only source of meaning. Entities appear to us as “standing 
reserves” through the approach of modern technology, but no single approach ever 
exhausts the meaningfulness of the entities. Steinbock calls this type of observation a 
“fundamental phenomenological insight, namely, that the way something gives itself 
corresponds simultaneously to the manner in which we turn toward it.”130 While 
Heidegger argues that technology accounts for the predominant way in which modern 
man relates to entities, it need not be the only way. Opening other ways for entities to 
appear requires a diversity of ways of turning toward them; perhaps it even requires 
unforeseen ways of engaging the world. Yet as Foucault has demonstrated, disciplinary 
technology does not encourage such creative relations to the world. 
The supreme danger of the disciplinary school is that it can autonomously dictate 
the standards for education and suppress the capacities of students to direct their own 
growth. As a technology, the disciplinary school participates in technology’s essence 
insofar as it creates its own autonomous direction for education. It is a technology that 
claims to serve the existential need for education, but it is able to determine what our 
education needs are and how they are best accomplished. These established mechanisms 
                                               
130 Steinbock, Anthony. Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology After Husserl. (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwest University Press, 1995), 263. 
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are difficult to face as a structure, and harder still to change by appealing to values 
outside of the institution. 
This investigation reveals that, strictly speaking, there is no politically neutral 
education. Indeed, education may be one of the most critical and sensitive grounds for 
politics. This is why we need to advocate for politically liberatory forms of education.131 
When a political problem is identified, very often there is a call for educative changes; it 
is thought that if people had more of the facts or were better trained, then a great many of 
the world’s problems could be overcome. What this investigation reveals is not that we 
need to adjust what we educate, but rather that we need to be careful how we educate. 
These practices are always positioned somewhere between the limit cases of merely 
ordering the world into the “standing-reserve” and critically interpreting and transforming 
the structures of our world. 
In the last lines of Discipline and Punish, Foucault gives a hopeful imperative. 
After describing the body as entirely situated within strategies of incarceration, Foucault 
says, 
[i]n this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of 
complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple 
mechanisms of ‘incarceration,’ objects for discourses that are in 
themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of 
battle.132 
 
I take this imperative to be somewhat of a call to arms. Rally the troops, for a battle is 
underway--a battle that could inaugurate new forms of meaning, or simply perpetuate the 
ordering of the world into “the standing reserve.” If the non-corporeal duplications of the 
                                               
131 For a suggestion of what this may look like, see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra 
Bergman Ramos, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2000). 
132 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 308. 
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body (the soul, the subject, consciousness) are a product and means of discipline, then it 
seems that Foucault has left us with limited means around which a strategy of resistance 
can be formed. In response to this problem, I have argued that radically attending to the 
body as the bearer of behavior provides a useful launching point for social critique. Our 
very corporeality, when understood not as an object but as the means of having a world, 
can be used to advocate against discipline. Yet, we should remember that critique itself is 
a tremendous risk: it involves attacking the very structures that have helped to install us 
into a meaningful world. If these structures have set us into a meaningful world, does this 
mean that they are inviolable? Such thinking, I can now add, is the supreme danger of our 
technological age. Instead of thinking these structures are inviolable, the significance of 
our world is actually extended and preserved, counter-intuitively, through the freedom to 
creatively and critically reimagine its foundations. 
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